


Human Rights in Tripura

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


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
A STUDY OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A RESULT OF INSURGENCY IN
NORTH EAST-NATURE OF STATE RESPONSE-USE OF
SPECIAL LAWS-VIOLATIONS BY NON-STATE ACTORS –
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION-
A RESEARCH STUDY IN TRIPURA



Neermahal



Ujjayanta



Ujjayanta

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Preface

National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi has sponsored this research study on Human Rights violations in the North-East. As the area of North East is very vast, the study was limited to Tripura state. The objectives of the study were to document the types of human rights violations, understand and analyze the causes and suggest remedial measures. Observance & respect for Human Rights is essential for Good Governance.

Preparatory work was completed initially in the Academy itself. As North East is disturbed due to insurgency, it was very difficult to get help and assistance from a suitable person for collection of data and field study. I am grateful to Smt. R. A. Mangathai, Assistant Professor, State Institute of Public Administration & Rural Development (SIPARD), Agartala for agreeing to conduct the field study and collection of data. I would also like to thank Shri G.S. Raju, Director, SIPARD for allowing Smt. Mangathai to do the work and also for all cooperation and assistance. Thanks are also due to Shri Ashish Patel, my PA for his continuous support and secretarial assistance.

This study could not have been completed successfully without the constant guidance and encouragement by Shri Binod Kumar, Director, LBS National Academy of Administration. I owe special thanks and gratitude to him.

M.H. Khan

Acknowledgement

This research study of Human rights situation in Tripura presents a bird's eye view of the life of people living in conflict prone areas in Tripura. An effort is made here to perceive the reality from closest corners and DOCUMENT the living conditions of the people. I owe a very deep gratitude to the tribal and rural men and women who responded to my questions forbearingly. Their difficulties notwithstanding, they extended hospitality to my team and to me. I am very grateful to the men and women for allowing us to document their experiences.

I am grateful to Mr. M. H. Khan Deputy Director (Sr.), Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, on whose initiative I have taken up this study, for his able guidance through out research study. I owe my thanks to Mr. G. S. Raju, Director, State Institute of Public Administration and Rural Development, Tripura for his encouragement and co-operation in conducting this study.

This study could not have been completed so fruitfully with out the enthusiastic contribution of my research assistants. I owe special thanks to Mr. Biswendu Bhattacharjee, Ms. Bhaswita, Mr. Dilip Barman and Mr. Biplab Bhattacharjee for their committed effort. They deserve appreciation for touring in all the sensitive areas with zeal to complete their task. I am also grateful to Mr. Jayanto Debnath for his timely support with the secondary data and photographs.

Needles to say, the views expressed in this study are purely based on the empirical data collected, and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the individuals or organisations mentioned here. If this study succeeds in generating a few initiatives then, I consider the purpose of the study is fulfilled.

Ms. Mangathai

Introduction

A Civil society and Human rights are two inter-twined social realities. The discourse on human rights is essential for the maintenance and prosperity of civil society. In a civil society the situations of strife and peace are felt in differing scales over a period of time. The strife or disturbances in the civil society alternately implies violation of human rights. Human rights are those rights which one has precisely because of being a human. To have human rights, one needs not to do anything special than to be born as human being. They are not earned, bought or inherited. Differences of sex, race, language and colour do not change these rights. The rights of people living in North East are same in the Constitution as for any other citizen of India. Of course, there are concessional provisions / benefits for those areas. However, it is a fact that the violation of human rights in the North-East is very grave and serious.

The North-East India even today represents to the average Indian, lands that are too distant, too complicated, violent and possibly ungovernable, faced with many problems which nobody seems to be serious about solving.

"That the North-East is a part of the country with unsurpassed natural beauty, with a rich unique cultural heritage and abundant natural resources, inhabited by a people who are basically gentle and decent, who given the right policies may progress as fast as the rest of the country", is known only in a few quarters.

Most of us are totally ignorant about the North-East or often we know wrong facts. It is very clear from the fact that most of us would not be able to name the capitals of all North-Eastern states correctly. I can remember that one of the teacher of my friend in Delhi University mentioned that Darjeeling is a beautiful place in the North-East. Similarly, if we see anybody coming from North-East India, we mistake him for Chinese or Japanese.

North-East India has its unique features in all dimensions – historical, social and cultural. Again the people confuse North-East India with a uniform identity. However, each and every part of North-East is peculiar, special and unique. The area is full of natural

resources – forest, horticulture and herbal etc. Similarly, the traditions and culture are very-very rich. Each and every tribe has its own age-old traditions & culture e.g. bamboo dance of Mizos, Naga dance, Râas Lila of Manipur, Bihu dance of Assam etc. Thus, it is very clear that North-East in itself has diversities, which have its own strengths.

In the Northeastern part of India violence and conflicts are a frequent sight. The academic and administrative experience shows that internal conflicts in Northeast are due to low levels of development, unrealised potentialities, geographical isolation and limited opportunities. There is also a need to develop overall a human rights culture for good governance and humane administration.

This study is an attempt to understand the nature of civil society in Tripura wherein tribes of different types live together with the non-tribals (mainly Bengalis). It is seen that their co-existence is both peaceful and volatile (or violent). The experience shows that incidents of ethnic conflicts between tribal and non-tribal and insurgent violence on ethnic lines are common in Tripura. In this background the status of human rights in Tripura needs to be understood. As the North East is very vast, it was decided to limit the study to Tripura state.

Objectives:

The objectives of the Study are-

- To understand the human rights situation in Tripura.
- To analyse the role of insurgency in perpetuation of human rights violation.
- To comprehend the role-played by the State actors (Administration, Police and Para Military) to restore human rights.
- To see if any non-government organization is involved in the human rights related activities.
- To suggest remedial Measures to improve the situation.

Methodology:

Before starting the actual study in the field, brainstorming was done on various issues. The planning as well as conduct of the study was discussed in detail with Smt. Mangathai several times. The suggestions and advice were also taken from faculty members in the Academy. The questionnaire for the field study was developed in consultation with Smt. Mangathai with great care and details.

- a) Since the study concerns the issue of Human rights, it has coverage all over the state. This study is mainly based on primary data collected from the field. The selective sampling technique is used since the focus is on insurgent violence and resultant human rights violation. Selective random sampling of the violence-affected pockets is done. The victims of violence and in case of their non-availability, their family members were interviewed. Detailed and in depth interviews were taken with the help of using both closed ended and open-ended questions.
- b) In each district the problem areas were selected taking the occurrence of violence and intensity of the damage as the indicator. From each sample area 20% of the affected people were interviewed. From each district 100 respondents were included in the study. As earlier stated, the respondents are either victims of human rights violation or close kin of the victims. In addition, the local administrative officers, teachers and the police were also interviewed. The interviews of higher officers in the Police, Para military forces and, few administrative officers were also taken. In West Tripura District Khowai and Bishalgarh sub-divisions were selected. In South Tripura in Amarpur sub-division and Udaipur sub-Division the study was conducted. In Dhalai District Kamalpur sub-Division, Gandacharra and Ambassa sub-Divisions were taken for the study. In North Tripura Kanchanpur and Kailashhar Sub-division were selected. In these Sub-divisions the disturbed areas where incidents have taken place were chosen for the study. Therefore the sampling has a wider coverage and it is selective random sampling.
- c) The data collection was done with the help of four research assistants under constant monitoring and co-ordination by Smt. Mangathai. The data consists of the perceptions, experiences and suggestions of civilians (Human Rights violation affected), administration and security forces. The data is represented in

tabular form under different categories (Annexure-I). Some of the significant data is presented graphically as a part of the analysis. The secondary data collected from different sources related to the problem in discussion (Human rights violation) is presented in the report as Annexure-II. This includes different types of data on insurgent activities and details of civilians and security forces and insurgents affected in the events of violence. Some of the incidents that have occurred in different districts in violation of Human Rights are also presented in this report as Annexure-III. The interview guide is enclosed as Annexure-IV.

Insurgency: The Concept

It is very important to know about the concept related to Insurgency before appreciating the causes of Human Rights violations as a result of Insurgency. Actually, Insurgency is not a very well defined term. Very often we find that insurgency is being interchangingly used with the terms like terrorism, extremism. We may find following characteristics in insurgency –

- i) There exists a deep seated distrust and discontent among a segment of indigenous population against the central authority on "certain issues and interests" which alienate them psychologically from those in authority.
- ii) The geographic location of these psychologically alienated people is invariably on the borders or periphery of the country.
- iii) Powers across the borders are willing to aid and abet and generally there exists some affinity between the populations living on both sides of the borders.
- iv) Insurgents generally enjoy the passive or active support of the masses and they do not like to annoy or harm them lest their wrath may fall on individuals who are suspected to be betrayers or informers.
- v) The insurgents do not normally damage the economy of the region, they want to liberate. Any damage caused to the economy may be incidental, but definitely not a part of the methods or means.
- vi) The duration of the insurgency movement is generally long, as its paths are tortuous.

The insurgency in the North-East has a long history. The pre-history, proto-history and even up to medieval period, the areas in the North-East were not governed and they were totally independent. After the modern treaty of Yandabao 1826, the situation changed. During the British period there was no direct control and the areas were either partially excluded or excluded areas from the point of view of administration by the British. There was nominal control and the fight with the British was a common phenomenon.

Background

Tripura is spread over an area of 10,486 sq. km. with green valleys and dense forests. It has a population of about 31 lakhs, of which nearly 31% of people are tribals. Bangladesh in North, West and South, and Assam and Mizoram in the east surround Tripura. Only 15% of the people of Tripura live in urban areas and 85% live in rural areas. The economy of the state is predominantly dependent on agriculture. The climate of the state is generally hot and humid. The state's reserved forest covers about 34% of the total area.



History:

Tripura was an independent Princely State ruled by Tripuri Maharajas for about 1300 years. It is said that Tripura was known as Tulpra - from Tui (water) and Pra (near), meaning a land adjoining water areas. The early history of Tripura, particularly prior to the 15th century is shrouded in the mists of legend and tradition. The state's history, therefore relates to two distinct periods- the traditional period as recorded in the Rajmala (Chronicles of the Tripura rajas) and the historical period recorded in the writings of the Mohammedan historians as well as Rajmala. The Tripura Rajas have assumed the title of Manikya and ruled over Cachar, Chaklaroshanabad etc. British appointed a political agent in 1871 for Tripura (at that time known as Hill Tipperah), and the kingdom enjoyed independent status subject to recognition of the British as the paramount power by its rulers. After the partition of India, the princely state formally acceded to the Union of India in October 1949 as a part of category C states. It became a Union territory on 1st November 1956 and a full-fledged State on 21st January 1972.

People:

There are as many as nineteen tribal communities in Tripura. The main tribes of Tripura are Tripuri, Reang, Jamatia, Chakma, Halam, Noatia, Mog, Oroan, Santal, Khasia, Bhil, Bhutia, Lepcha, Lushai, Uchai, Kuki, Garo and Munda. Although before independence the tribals were majority their proportion is decreasing over years. The growth and compositional change in population over to last nine decades are presented in the following table-

TABLE: Compositional changes in population in Tripura

Census Year	Schedule Castes	Scheduled Tribes	Others
1901	NA	53%	47%
1911	NA	48%	52%
1921	NA	56%	44%
1931	NA	50%	50%
1941	NA	50%	50%
1951	6%	37%	57%
1961	10%	32%	58%
1971	12%	29%	59%
1981	15%	28%	56%
1991	16%	31%	53%

NA- Not available

Source: Census of India, various publications



The principal reason for the relative decline in the tribal population of the state is the geographical contiguity that attracted people in the territory from East Bengal, which almost encircles it. During the pre-partition days, thousands of Bengalese were in fact the inhabitants of Chakla-Roshanabad, the biggest Zamindari estate of the Maharajas. Due to partition of the country, the area merged to East Pakistan, and a large number of Hindus migrated to the

State. Besides, the Royal family wanted to maintain a close contact with Bengal for fostering education, trade and commerce in the state. These apart, administrative personnel of different sorts were also recruited from Bengal during the Royal regime.

This initial influx of outsiders in to the state was followed by a deluge at the time of India's partition in 1947, and again in 1971, with steady streams in between which continues even today. Alienation of land of the tribal people has resulted from the influx of immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan since 1947. It cannot be ruled out that the economy of the State had to undergo stress and strain as a result of an unprecedented rise in population. Land alienation of tribals was one such major problem. This was caused mainly by less land being available for tribals to cultivate, especially landless tribals who are traditionally dependent upon jhum cultivation and as a consequence indebtedness of tribal people to the money lenders and traders increased.

It was only in 1960 that the Tripura land revenue and Land Reforms Act was brought into force. The Act imposed restrictions on transfer of land from tribals to non-tribals. The Act was first amended in 1974 to provide for restoration of illegally transferred land. In order to protect the interiors of the tribal people, the Autonomous District Council and Village Councils were set up in 1982 under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution. All villages with a majority of tribal population came in to the ambit of the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council.



Insurgency in Tripura:

There are two major militant groups operating in Tripura as below: -

Outfits	Strength	Weaponry	Area of Influence	Objective
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	600	300	All the 4 districts of states	Independence of Tripura
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	500	200	Parts of West Tripura, South Tripura and Dhalai district	- do -

Present Situation

Few important features of present situation in Tripura may be summarized as below: -

- Tribal insurgency
- Main demands of Tribal groups :
 - ♦ Sovereignty and deportation of Bangladeshi migrants
 - ♦ Restoration of alienated land
 - ♦ Merger of Tripura with India also questioned
- Areas under 23 police stations fully and 8 partially declared disturbed areas.
- Change in demographic profile due to illegal migration.
- Both NLFT and ATTF have remained active indulging in violent depredations including killing of SFs and non-tribals.
- All the 4 districts affected by terrorist violence. Level of violence under decline since 2001.
- Extensive use of Bangladesh for shelter/camps & procurement of arms.

The genesis of Tripura's ethnic problem manifested itself in the ongoing tribal insurgency. The change in the demographic composition and the resultant land alienation, poverty, indebtedness

and poor access to basic development services for the tribal people are the main causes of insurgency in Tripura. The problem is seen to be rooted in the ethnic identity. This led to divisions among people along tribal/non-tribal lines and a move towards an armed struggle. The insurgents are drawn mainly from tribal communities, and, from non-tribal communities also insurgent groups have emerged.

Frustrated over the continued political and economic marginalisation of their communities, a group of educated tribal youths raised the first banner of discontent in June 1967 by forming the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), with only tribal peoples the members. The TUJS floated its student anti Tribal Student Federation



(TSF) in 1968, and also formed a women front under the banner of Tripura Sundari Nari Vahini (TSNV). The armed wing of TUJS was formed as "Tripura Sena" under the stewardship of Bijoy Hrangkhrawl. The primary objective of these organizations is to protect the rights and privileges of the tribal communities and to establish an independent Tribal State in Tripura. The ethnic militancy of the TUJS and its communal campaign evoked a strong reaction in the majority Bengali community and resulted the emergence of "Amra Bengali", being patronized by Anand-Margis. Thus the two communal organizations which are diametrically opposite in their ideology over cast the political horizon of Tripura.

The boiling communal feelings erupted in large-scale riots in 1980, which led to the death of 1300 people and loss of properties worth lakhs of rupees. The Bengalis died in large numbers but the tribals were also the real losers in the ethnic riots. The 1980's riots left a deep scar on tribal psychology and this found expression in bouts of violence by a different militant outfits. Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhrawl, had floated Tribal National Volunteers (TNV) as an underground outfit way back in Dec, 1978, while continuing as organizing Secretary of TUJS. Because of his close rapport with erstwhile Mizo National Front supreme- Lal Denga the members of TNV received training and base

facilities in Bangladesh territory. Not surprisingly, TNV played an active role in June 1980 riots. The blood-spilling insurgency continued for a decade with the vague demand to free Tripura. The TNV militancy formally came to an end on August 10, 1988 after signing the tripartite TNV Peace accord.

But the militancy still continued with the ATTF (All Tripura Tribal Force) and NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura) two insurgent groups indulging in violence. It is said that some of the former TNV commanders who laid down weapons after the peace accord had joined these militant groups. The ATTF militants have signed an agreement with state government in 1993 when around 1500 ATTF activities formally laid down arms at Shikaribari in North Tripura. Other groups including a dissident faction of NLFT have bidden fare well to arms. But violence by the insurgent groups is continuing unabated. Currently around 20 rebel groups are active in the State notwithstanding the continuous process of surrender. The civilians are becoming the main targets of the ethnically and communally motivated extremist groups.

This is the background of the insurgency in which the present study was carried out. The present study as earlier mentioned is an attempt to see the underlying causes of insurgent violence and to suggest remedial measures. The study report is mainly divided into nine parts-

1. Socio-Economic Profile of the respondents
2. Law and order situation
3. Living conditions and Human rights
4. Problems
5. Role of state actors and Human Rights
6. Police and Human rights in Tripura
7. Para Military forces and Human rights
8. Miscellaneous
9. Remedial Measures

Socio-Economic Profile

The Socio-Economic Profile of the people will enable to understand the background of the respondents in this study on Human rights situation. The sample in the study consists of both male (75.5%) and female (24.5%). They are from various communities. Majority of the people are from general castes (37%), followed closely by the Scheduled Tribes (36.25%) and Scheduled Caste (14%). Other Backward Caste people are approximately 12.5% of the sample. So the sample is representative of different communities. The rural population is more, as the study is not restricted to any town area. Instead it was concentrated in the interior areas of the state where substantial number of people experienced / are experiencing insurgency. Hinduism is the major religion (74.75%) practiced by the respondents. Other religions are Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, which also have reasonable size of followers (15.25%, 5.25% and 2.5% respectively) among the sample. The following table (I) give the sex and caste details of the respondents.

Table-I

		North	Dhalal	West	South	Total	%age
Sex	Male	84	75	86	57	302	75.5
	Female	16	25	14	43	98	24.5
Caste	General	32	30	65	21	148	37
	SC	22	13	6	15	56	14
	ST	28	48	20	49	145	36.25
	Others	17	9	9	15	50	12.5

The respondent's educational standards are varying. Illiterates among the respondents were 27.5% and those who received education till primary level are almost the same (29.25%). One quarter of the sample received education till higher secondary (24.25%) and the graduates (9.25%) are less. So the educated class in the sample is about 63%, which is quite satisfactory, though the standards of education are not very high. The following table (II) shows the details district-wise.

Table-II

Education	North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Illiterate	12	36	5	57	110	27.5
Primary	32	31	43	11	117	29.25
Secondary	31	16	22	28	97	24.25
Higher Sec	16	12	9	0	37	9.25
Graduate	9	5	21	4	39	9.75

Tripura has agricultural economy with many people engaged in agricultural activities as labourers or cultivators. Among the respondents majority (52%) is involved in agricultural activities and rest of them engaged in business or small jobs. Almost all (81%) of the respondents are below poverty line and only 19% have a comfortable living standards and a minority among these respondents are from well to do families. The monthly incomes are shown in the table (III).

Table-III

Income	North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Below 1500	35	58	61	56	210	52.5
1500-2500	32	20	25	37	114	28.5
2500-5000	27	12	13	3	55	13.75
5000-7500	6	12	17	0	35	8.75

To sum up, the majority respondents are of Hindu community. They are from general castes, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. To a great extent they belong to Below Poverty Line (BPL) and they are engaged in agriculture-based activities.

Law and Order Situation

These days Tripura is to be seen in news in and across different parts of the country. The State is badly affected by the activities of the armed militant insurgent groups. As a result there are two kinds of troubles constantly faced by the people of Tripura – Ethnic conflict and Insurgency.

Ethnic conflict and insurgency problems are not mutually exclusive; rather they reinforce each other. People experiencing the ethnic conflict and insurgency problems are sometimes the same people and at other times different people are affected. There is an insecurity and disbelief in the air. Everybody is suspicious of the other person. Due to these problems people are constantly facing trouble in daily life. Due to this situation, the human rights are endangered.



In the State almost half of the interior areas is experiencing insurgency. The intensity of the problem can be understood better through the figures given in this table (IV). The district wise details are shown in the table below.

Table-IV

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Harmony in Res. Area	Yes	57	64	5	39	165	41.25
	No	43	36	95	61	235	58.75
Experience of Ethnic Violence	Yes	52	47	100	94	293	73.25
	No	48	53	0	6	107	26.75

The following diagram (I) depicts this situation of the people in the state.




Diagram-I

Harmony in residential areas is seen only in 41.25% of interior areas of the State. The majority of the areas in the State (58.75%) are experiencing disharmony. About 3/4ths of the respondents experienced ethnic violence. Around 73.25% of the respondents experienced some form of ethnic violence or the other. There is disharmony in habitational areas due to mutual mistrust among the people. The trouble in different parts of the State in the form of insurgency is responsible for the disharmony and ethnic conflict and violence. The ethnic violence is taking different forms. It is physical harassment, killing or clashes.

The people in interior areas as well as those living in semi-urban areas and towns are also experiencing ethnic conflict between tribals and non-tribals in different forms. Primary reasons for the ethnic violence are - Past injustice, lack of opportunities, encouragement of interest groups and resultant ethnic animosity. To elaborate-firstly, both the communities in Tripura (Tribal and Non-Tribal) believe that their development is hampered due to the presence of the other group. Secondly, Tripura being a small State, with weak communication and infrastructure, does not have many openings for investment, production and employment. Therefore, there are very few opportunities for employment and development. Hence there is mutual hatred for each other with infighting among the people for existing limited opportunities. Thirdly, various groups -political, religious or militant or other interest groups - perpetuate deep mistrust among the people to promote their ulterior motives. All these

factors are resulting in ethnic animosity leading to ethnic violence. The following table (V) depicts the reasons for the hatred among people.

Table-V

Reasons	North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Past injustice	33	41	0	60	134	33.5
Lack of opportunities	7	21	90	8	126	31.5
Interest groups	60	18	10	19	107	26.75
Ethnic Animosity	0	20	0	13	33	8.25

The following diagram (II) shows the reasons for ethnic hatred and violence.




Diagram-II

In the study, 33.5% feel that the ethnic violence is due to past injustices and 31.5% feel that it is due to lack of opportunities that conflicts are taking place. Encouragement by different interest groups is cited as one of the reasons for violence by 26.75% of the people. Ethnic animosity is perceived as a reason by 8.25% of the sample. Thus these reasons account for the root of the trouble.

Immediate cause for the conflict is not always the reason for conflict. However, these are the reflections and they are always acting as ignition keys to massive conflicts. The immediate reasons are rooted in the interaction of one group towards the other group. The

immediate reasons for violence found in the study are arrest, killing, kidnapping and also extortion, and political interests. In a particular place, if a person from a particular community is killed/kidnapped/arrested, the other community is held responsible. There is an occurrence of ethnic conflict when extortion by dominant ethnic groups or by insurgents of one ethnic group creates trouble to the remaining people. In the case of the present study, it is found that killing (38.75%) and kidnapping, on many occasions, are immediate reasons for outburst of ethnic violence in the State. The consequences of such violence and hatred are multiple. The right to life and free movement of civilians is curtailed by these ethnic disturbances. The houses are destroyed, families are displaced, and children are orphaned. For the victims of violence ultimately life is changed for worse forever.

In Tripura in addition to ethnic violence, the violation of human rights has another side, i.e., insurgent violence. Violence caused by extremists leading to deprivations of Human rights for the people. There are different reasons for inflicting violence by the extremists on civilians. These are shown in the table (VI) below.

Table-VI

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Reasons for Violence by Extremists	Political Rivalry	42	13	0	10	65	16.25
	Suspicion	21	21	10	49	101	25.25
	Disobedience to their Orders	36	49	20	24	129	32.25
	Different ethnic group	1	17	70	17	105	26.25

This is presented in the Diagram III.




Diagram-III

Generally most of the violence (32.25%) by insurgents is inflicted upon those who do not obey their orders. Obeying the orders of militants implies giving them monetary support, physical support, information or any other kind of support. Another important reason is that the victims of violence belong to different ethnic groups (26.25%). It is seen that insurgents often indulge in violence on people who belong to rival political groups (16.25%), or when they suspect that any person is a police informer (25.25%). They indulge in killing or kidnapping of the suspected person or his family members. Broadly due to these kinds of reasons the insurgents are troubling the common people. The insurgents can be non-tribal or tribal and victims also are tribal and non-tribal. The indulgent persons in violence and victims of violence are changing from time to time and place to place. But the end result of violence is the same- unbearable humiliation and pain suffered by the people.

Violence is a big vicious cycle. Once caused or affected, it will have numerous ramifications. Revenge or retribution is another reason for violence in the case of ethnic violence or insurgent violence. The extent to which violence generates violence is shown in the table (VII) below.

Table-VII

Revenge / retribution Reason for violence	Response	North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
	Yes	35	64	41	71	211	52.75
	No	65	36	59	29	189	47.25

It is seen that the past incidents of violence have cumulative effect on the future events. In this study it is revealed that 52.75% of the respondents say that revenge or retribution is the reason for violence. The past animosities have a strong role in perpetuating violence. Thus volatile ethnic situation and insurgent activities are hampering human progress in Tripura.

Living under Conflict and Human Rights

The socio-economic status of the people in Tripura indicates poor standards of living. People below poverty line are more than 70%. The same situation reflects in the sample of our study also. The victims of the insurgency are deprived of the basic necessities of life - food, clothing and shelter. In our study when people across the state were interacted with, not very encouraging information about their standard of life have emerged. The coverage of facilities available to people living under conflict situation are presented in this table (VIII).

Table-VIII

	Response	North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Earlier Facilities	Almost	58	10	36	11	115	28.75
Available	Only Some	40	48	26	69	183	45.75
	Don't have	2	42	38	20	102	25.5

A diagrammatical representation is presented here for a better understanding.




Diagram-IV

From the above diagram it can be understood that all basic necessities of life were provided after disturbances to only 22.25% of

the sample and about 37.5% of the respondents revealed that most of their essential necessities are available. So around 74.5% of the victims of violence are provided with all or some facilities. But 40.25% of the respondents feel that they were not provided any of the necessities of life.

The plight of these people shows that in the trouble prone and disturbed areas, the basic necessities of life are not provided. Lack of drinking water, safe and secure accommodation, lack of medical facilities and means of living are the problems of the people. The respondents have given three possible reasons for the non-provision of these facilities - insurgency, slow development and administrative indifference. They are given below in the table (IX).

Table -IX

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Reasons for Non availability	Extremism	36	61	51	55	203	49.50
	Slow Development	20	25	25	30	100	24.39
	Admn. Indifference	44	24	24	15	107	26.11

This is shown in the Diagram-V.




Diagram-V

Insurgency (49.50%) is the single major reason cited by half of the respondents for non -availability of essential services. Due to insurgency people had to leave their homes and as a consequence there is tremendous instability in their life. Slow development (24.39%) is considered as the second reason for the absence of livable shelter, drinking water and other facilities. Administrative 'indifference' to take up activities in these areas (26.11%) is also cited as another reason for the poor living conditions of the respondents. Due to insurgency and ethnic problem citizens are displaced and uprooted. Developmental activities and rehabilitation measures could not be implemented by the administration effectively in the remotest areas of the state due to insurgency.

An average citizen of Tripura is poor and is struggling hard to make his both ends meet. The two problems of ethnic unrest and insurgency are added to his difficulties. Day by day and year after year these problems are taking intense shape. The youth among tribal and non-tribal families are increasingly getting attracted to the anti-social activities. It was observed that the reason for joining insurgent groups is mainly due to economic reasons. From the table (X) below the reasons can be well understood.

Table -X

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Reasons to Join Insurgent Groups	Unemployment	34	23	60	58	175	43.75
	Economic Reasons	54	49	36	22	161	40.25
	Ignorance / illiteracy	12	4	0	0	16	4
	Police harassment	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Tribal Development	0	14	4	20	38	9.5

About 84% of the respondents told that the youth join these groups for the livelihood. Only 9.5% youth joined the insurgent outfits to develop their communities and 7% of the respondents told that they joined insurgent groups for the development of tribals.

It is a vicious cycle of events, which is keeping the problems of under development alive in Tripura. Due to the poor standards of living, the youth are being attracted to insurgent activities. Because of extremist activities, the developmental activities are not having the desired impact, leaving behind many poor and backward to their fate.

Problems in Tripura

The deprivation of human rights is not an uncommon experience for those who are living in a volatile situation. The aim of the study is to understand the status of Human Rights in Tripura. This is possible only if we know whether the people are leading a decent life or whether they perceive any threat to their peaceful life, due to the violations of Human rights. Both the non-state actors and state actors or either of them may cause the violations. Hence we will analyse this Human rights issue in Tripura from three angles – Ethnic disturbances, insurgent activities and state action.

In Tripura, in the interior areas almost all (84.25%) people seemed to have been affected by extremist/insurgent violence in some form or the other. This is shown in the table (XI).

Table-XI

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Victim Of Extremism	Yes	71	73	96	97	337	84.25
	No	29	27	4	3	63	15.75

If we again mention what was discussed earlier, majority (73.25%) of the people are affected by the ethnic violence. This was shown in diagram-I.

The problems encountered due to insurgency are mainly kidnapping, killing, extortion or forcible donations and threats. The following table (XII) shows the same: -

Table-XII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Problem Encountered	Kidnapping	31	31	11	50	123	30.75
	Killing	12	15	40	2	69	17.25
	Extortion	28	17	39	32	116	29
	Threat	29	36	10	17	92	23

The intensity of the problems faced is also shown in the following Diagram (Diagram - VI).




Diagram-VI

Kidnapping is gradually becoming an easy source of income for anti social elements in Tripura. According to the government records (See Annexure -II table-I) the total number of kidnapped in the past 7 years (1993-2000) is around 2486 persons. The kidnappings in the past three years (1998-2000) while Tripura witnessed intensive insurgent activities accounts for half of this (1355). These are the cases of kidnap, which are reported and registered in the police stations. We should not ignore here the numerous instances of kidnappings that are never reported or settled unofficially. Among the kidnapped, almost 70% were released. As earlier mentioned from 1993 to 2000, there is an alarming rise in the kidnappings. In 1993 the number of kidnapped persons were 96, but by 2000 the total number of kidnapped increased to 474 (almost 5 times more). The main reason is the increasing insurgent outfits and activities (inter-State extremist organisational links, training and induction of more youth in the cadre) in the state. The nature of the difficult terrain and geographical location of Tripura, is very conducive to the extremist activities. It is strikingly noticed that the tribals are the main victims in kidnappings (Table-II, Annexure II).

Killing in extremist violence and insurgent attacks is a brutal violation of human rights. No person has the right to deprive the others of the right to life-the fundamental human right. The insurgents in Tripura are no exception to other extremist organizations in the country in depriving the life of civilians. As the

government records reveal (Annexure II Table -I), the number of people killed (which includes civilians and police and Para military forces) by extremists is increasing year after year. The incidents of increasing house burning, indiscriminate firing at the market places and ambushes also deserve a mention here.

Among the sample, 31% are affected by kidnapping of their family members or themselves. Extortion of money as tax, subscription or donation for different militant outfits is a common experience (29%) in all the trouble prone areas. The extortion sometimes is in kind also- e.g. chicken, rice and some more items that are useful for them. The collections range from Rs. 50/- to Rs 10,000/- or more depending on the situation, capacity of the payers and the need of the demanding people. Killings are not uncommon but they are less than other problems, however, it is seen that 17.25% of the respondents are victims of killings of family members. Threats by the tribal ethnic groups or extremist groups through pamphlets and in person are experienced by almost one-third people (23%) of the sample.

In the course of research, as earlier mentioned different categories of people are victimized. The allegiance to different political party, Suspicion of being the police informer, belongingness to different ethnic group and economically stronger position are the main reasons for the insurgent violence. The following table (XIII) shows the intensity of each of the reasons.

Table-XIII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Reason	Diff. Pol. Party	25	19	0	6	50	12.5
	Wealthy	24	18	0	7	49	12.25
	Ethnic Group	51	27	100	42	220	55
	Suspicion	0	36	0	45	81	20.25

These are shown below in the Diagram VII.




Diagram-VI

Two strong reasons emerged, firstly the victims/families of the victims belonged to another ethnic group (whether tribal or non-tribal). More than half (55%) of the victimization is due to mutual antagonistic feelings of the ethnic groups. Secondly, suspicion of being police informers and supporters of anti-extremist activities. This accounted for causing problems to 20.25% of the sample. When these armed groups suspect any one, either the suspected or their family members are made victims of harsh treatment/problems. Other reasons stated were that the victims belonged to different political affiliations or interest groups (12.5%) and also that the victims or their family members were wealthy persons (12.25%) from whom financial support could be extracted.

A point that needs to be mentioned here is that tax payment to the extremists is an ongoing practice in Tripura. The frequency of tax payment is shown in the table (XIV).

Table-XIV

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Tax Payment	Always	39	37	5	14	95	23.75
	Occasionally	32	25	6	25	88	22
	Never	29	33	89	61	212	53

Due to this fact, the civilians live under constant tension. The following diagram- VIII will show us the intensity of the problem.




Diagram-VII

Tax to insurgents is paid by 23.75% of the civilians regularly and 22% occasionally. So altogether nearly half (45.75%) of the people who are living in the interior areas are paying taxes. This tendency is due to fear of extremists. The table (XV) below shows the same: -

Table-XV

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Reason	Support	34	0	0	1	35	8.75
	Fear	66	100	100	99	365	91.25

The respondents (91.25%) expressed that the tax-payment is done due to fear of anti-social groups rather than due to support/sympathy to the ideology of insurgent groups. The common people pay taxes regularly or occasionally because they are scared of the consequences of the wrath of the armed groups for disobedience.

Human rights violations and women

In Tripura the human rights of women are violated by the insurgents and also during ethnic clashes. The following figure shows the women affected by insurgents in the year 1997 to 30.04.2003 in Tripura.

Sl. No	Head of crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 upto 30.4.03
1	Torture 498 (A) IPC	01	03	01	06	04	-	01
2	Out rage of modesty	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	Rape	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	Kidnapping	-	02	03	08	02	02	-
5	Murder	03	07	05	11	03	08	03
6	Others	01	-	02	01	-	-	-
	Total	05	12	11	26	09	10	04

The above information indicated the atrocities committed by insurgents that are reported and recorded. The above figures show that cases of kidnapping and killing of women are more. But no cases of rape of the women are reported. This may be due to the social stigma or fear of insurgents. But fortunately in Tripura, so far no atrocities are reported to be committed against the women by the para military forces or police personnel.

Role of NGOs

The presence of the NGO's in the interior areas is hardly visible, with only 32.75% of the areas having Non Governmental Organisations working since the past 1-3 years. The activities of the NGO'S are mostly limited to education and income generation. None of the NGOs are working with the issues of insurgent activities, army/police excesses or ethnic violence. Interaction among Non Government Organisations, Administration and Police is very occasional. Majority respondents (78.62%) feel that the role of the NGOs in the economic and educational development is positive, though for counter insurgency it is minimal.

Role of State Actors and Human Rights

As mentioned in the earlier parts of the analysis there were disturbances and displacements in the lives of people living in interior areas of Tripura. As the custodian of civil rights- the administration has the responsibility to protect the citizens. The administrative rehabilitation response expected during the times of trouble is, providing security (temporary), construction of the dwelling place (accommodation) and looking after fulfillment of basic necessities e.g. food, clothing, drinking water and sanitation in those areas affected by violence. In the study, almost half of the respondents received rehabilitation by provision of immediate security through deployment of police/Para military forces or arrangement of security for the victims. Other main rehabilitation measures taken are, accommodation (23.25%) and basic necessities (21.25%). Around 54.5% of the respondents told that the immediate assistance during the problem time was received from the police. Though armed forces could offer help to 12.75% of the respondents, under the administrative supervision, it is mainly the police who offered direct rescue during the times of trouble. In such a situation the task of administration is crisis management by using appropriate mechanisms, either police or Para military forces.

During the times of trouble, it is the responsibility of the administration to provide security, accommodation and peaceful co-existence. These are the primary pre-conditions cited by the people to return back to their earlier habitations. This is very significant in interior areas where around 56.25% of the sample changed their residence due to insurgency. When there is a change of residence, the necessary basic facilities need to be provided. In a situation where only about 28.75% of the people could secure all the basic necessities for living, the task to be fulfilled by State Govt. becomes more challenging.

The assistance and protection for the victims of violence is well assured. Government has passed various orders and taken suitable actions to provide the victims of violence, maximum and suitable rehabilitation and relief. All the State Government employees

including the policemen, who sustained injuries due to extremist violence during the discharge of duties, are entitled to get free medical treatment for injuries. In case of treatment to be given outside, all the charges of treatment, transport and incidental charges will be fully reimbursed. (1997 June Finance Department memorandum)

In 1998 the Government took steps to extend financial benefit to the affected people. The relief to be extended to injured persons, due to extremist's violence to a major extent provides financial covers to the victims of violence. The significant point is that benefit is extended to the injured members of common public who are victims of extremist violence. There are different kinds of assistance, which are as follows- For simple injury (assistance up to Rs. 1000/-) for the serious physical injury requiring hospitalization (assistance up to Rs. 3000/-) and physical injury leading to loss of any vital organ or limb (assistance up to Rs. 15,000/-) (June 1998, Department of Finance Memorandum).

A step ahead in this direction is the ex-gratia assistance in the event of death due to extremist's violence payable to members of the public. The government pays Rs. 50,000/- to the family members of the deceased (above 18 years of age) and Rs. 25,000/- is paid to the family members of the deceased (below 18 years of age) if deserving candidates for job is not available in these bereaved families (August 1998 Revenue department memorandum). Subsequently these facilities are extended to the next of kin of persons missing after abduction and were suspected to have been killed by extremists. This benefit will be extended only when the persons have been missing for two years or more (May 1999 Department of Finance Memorandum).

In 2000 the financial assistance for persons (officials and public) affected in extremist violence is increased in case of death or permanent in validation. For police and Home-guards Rs. 3 lakhs during actual conduct of operations and Rs. 2 lakhs during extremist violence other than operations will be given. For CRPF/ Army Rs. 2 lakhs during actual conduct of operations and Rs. 1 lakh during extremist violence other than operations is assumed. The government gives Rs. 2 lakhs financial assistance for non-police State Government officers in case they are victims of such violence. For members of public the financial assistance is increased to Rs. 1.25 lakhs in case of death against Rs. 50,000 at present if no suitable candidate for job is available. The common public will get an assistance of Rs. 50,000 for

total disability and Rs. 15,000 immediate financial assistance will be given to the family of the deceased, up to a maximum of Rs 25000 per family in case there are more than one deaths (January 2000 Department of finance Memorandum).

The government has taken several positive steps to provide benefit to the next kin of persons missing by relaxing the conditions for getting relief. It is decided that next of the kin of persons abducted by extremists, who is missing for 2 years or more shall be eligible for benefits after ascertaining that there is a report to the Police Station about abduction and the SP has to submit a report confirming the abduction. This is done mainly to avoid difficulty in assessing the person as died or killed even after he/she has been missing for more than 2 years unless strong evidence exist (January 2000, General Administration (P&T) department Memorandum).

In those instances where people are subjected to ethnic violence or extremist violence and lost their houses due to arson, government is sanctioning ex-gratia allowance. The government is providing both financial and physical assistance to those whose houses are lost in arson (July 2000, Revenue department Memorandum). These are some of the main actions taken by the government to restore normalcy in life of the victims of insurgent violence and ethnic violence.

There is a mixed response of the people to administrative action in restoring normalcy in the troubled areas. This is presented in the following table (XVI) and diagram (VIII).

Table-XVI

		North	DhalaI	West	South	Total	%age
Satisfaction with Admn. Response	Yes	35	19	56	58	168	42
	No	65	81	44	42	232	58




Diagram-VIII

Among the respondents nearly half (42%) of them are satisfied with the administrative action. The remaining (58%) expect that administration needs to do more in ensuring its citizens a hassle free and comfortable life. The citizens (64.5%) feel that the visits of the administrative and security personnel to the troubled areas should become more regular. The table (XVII) below shows the different types of administrative response experienced.

Table -XVII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Nature of Admn. Response	Immediate	20	8	39	0	67	16.75
	Slow	75	45	49	79	248	62
	Delayed	5	47	12	21	85	21.25

Though the nature of administrative response is slow in more than half (62%) of the sample, it is felt that administration is receptive to complaints.

So as far as the administration is concerned, as seen above through different administrative steps, it is striving hard to ensure good life to the citizens. Rehabilitation, maintenance of peaceful co-existence and provision of basic amenities to all the citizens are the main concerns of the State administration.

Police and the Human Rights in Tripura

The Police activities in the State are another important issue to be understood to perceive the nature of Human Rights protection in Tripura. According to the International Human Rights covenant and even Indian legal system no person can be arrested without a warrant. In our study around 52.5% of



the respondents revealed that under NASA arrests were made in their residential areas. It is mandatory that an arrest can be made only with a warrant. The different responses came up in this study regarding arrests, which are presented in the following table (XVIII) and represented in the-Diagram -IX.

Table-XVIII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Arrest with warrant	Always	95	12	19	7	133	33.25
	Occasionally	3	54	81	68	206	51.5
	Never	2	34	0	25	61	15.25




Diagram-IX

Around 51.5% of respondents stated that arrests with warrants are occasional as per their knowledge and 33.25% of the respondents stated that arrests are always done with warrant in their knowledge. Arrest are never done with warrant is the experience of 15.25% of the respondents. Opinions are formed on one's own experience only. ***So it is nearly clear that arrests are not always done with proper notice and warrant.***

It is very important to know, in case of arrests, who are the persons arrested i.e. identity of arrested persons. Majority (64.5%) expressed that on many occasions extremists (over ground and under ground) and those who are connected with those anti-social elements are arrested. It is also felt that (35.5%) in the process sometimes innocents are also arrested. These arrests are made due to mistaken identity or suspicious behaviour or to get information from them. But anyhow it is seen that arrest of the real culprits is most likely in many of the cases (78.2%) in different types of crime and insurgent activities.

The response of the police during disturbances and in law and order maintenance is varied. The following table (XIX) and diagram X will show the nature of police response in the times of crisis.

Table-XIX

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Police quick response	Likely	33	27	5	33	98	24.5
	Least likely	58	40	65	65	228	56.25
	Most likely	9	33	30	2	74	18.5




Diagram-X

It is seen that during times of trouble quick response from the police is least likely (56.25%) to come. *Immediate* security in case of trouble is not always available from the police. Only 21.25% respondents stated that police security could be arranged during the time of need. But if we analyse the police excesses, it is found that the police excesses are less prevalent in Tripura. It is shown here in the following table (XX) and diagram-XI.

Table-XX

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Police Excesses	Yes	28	33	0	36	97	24.25
	No	72	67	100	64	303	75.75




Diagram-XI

Only 24.25% of the respondents stated that the Police excesses are experienced in their areas. These excesses are of different types. Arrest without warrant and harsh treatment are the most common form of the excesses. But the majority of the people did not experience Police excesses (75.75%).

Violation of Human rights by the police is also another important concern in our study. The extent of violation of human rights is shown here in the following table (XXI) and diagram -XII.

Table-XXI

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Police violation of Human rights	Yes	17	10	0	46	74	18.5
	No	77	81	100	68	326	81.5




Diagram-XII

So with regard to violation of Human Rights also majority (81.5%) of the respondents did not experience any violation, only 18.5% of the respondents experienced violations by the Police. As earlier stated arrest without warrant, beating and curtailment of physical movement, are the common forms of violations that are experienced. The police atrocities on women are nearly absent. None of the respondents reported such cases.

In the present state of affairs in Tripura, delayed action or slow response of police is the main problem resulting in violation of human rights. When there is a trouble/conflict or a crisis, police could not respond immediately.

Paramilitary Forces and Human Rights

In Tripura, the armed forces deployed are highly disproportionate to its small population of approximately 30 lakhs. Across the state now, almost all interior places have camps of different security forces. The Border Security Force in the state is quite visible due to border with Bangladesh. In our study the majority of the respondents considered the role of army & paramilitary as positive (62.75%) though a significant proportion of 37.25% feel that the role of paramilitary forces is negative and makes the insurgents behave more offensively. The response of paramilitary forces during the times of trouble is shown below in the following table (XXII) and represented in the Diagram-XIII.

Table-XXII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Response during times of Trouble	Polite	45	35	0	2	82	20.5
	Harsh	27	32	91	75	225	56.25
	Indifferent	28	33	9	23	93	23.25




Diagram-XIII

During the times of trouble the response of the Para military forces is either indifferent (23.25%) or harsh (56.25%) and on some occasions, the respondents witnessed polite treatment (20.5%). The main service received during the times of trouble by a majority of

respondents (49.5%) was the protection and security provided by the forces. Assistance is also received in the form of provision of transport (85%) to those in the interior and trouble prone areas. In some cases (15.75%) the Para military forces acted as a facilitator between people in interior areas and State agencies in providing information of their difficulties.

The extent of the excesses committed by the Para military forces and their intensity is presented in the following table (XXIII) and diagram-XIV.

Table-XXIII

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Atrocities committed by Armed forces	Yes	15	19	9	63	106	26.5
	No	85	81	91	37	294	73.5




Diagram-XIV

Though a majority (73.5%) did not experience any excesses committed by Para-military forces, about 26.5% of the respondents experienced excesses by them. The following table (XXIV) shows the nature of violations indulged in by the Para-military forces.

Table-XXIV

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Nature of Excesses	Movement curtailed	5	10	9	2	26	6.5
	Beating	10	4	0	36	50	12.5
	Arrest without warrant	0	5	0	21	26	6.5
	Money extortion	0	0	0	4	106	26.5

Curtailment of movement, Physical harassment (beating), random arrests, extortion and detentions are the common forms of violations committed by the Para-military forces. Beating or physical harassment (12.5%) is reported to be more. Next to beating another main harassment was extortion in the border areas for trans- border trade and the like.

Almost half (47.25%) of the respondents are aware of the NASA, which is in force in Tripura. Arrests under NASA in their areas are reported by 52.25% of the respondents and 62.75% of them feel that these arrests are justified. So the arrests under NASA in Tripura are perceived to be without mala fide and genuine.

In the case of Para military forces also the atrocities on civilians in Tripura are relatively less compared to many other States like Jammu& Kashmir, Manipur where armed action took place or is taking place.

Civil-Military Relations (Including Paramilitary): Administrative Issues

The Civil-Military relations are very important, specially in insurgency prone areas. Civil administration, CPMF, Army, IB, RAW, SSB etc. are functioning and performing the duties assigned to them. However, a proper synergy among all of them is required, so that the strategy becomes more meaningful. Various structures / arrangements have been made for coordination etc., but it might be kept in mind that the civil administration always exists and there is no military / security forces rule. Of course, the operations etc. will be conducted, as per requirements, however the civil administration will always exist and is never suspended. Many a times there is confusion in the minds of agencies and it may lead to ego clash or one up man-ship. Hence, the very purpose of the counter insurgency strategy is defeated. The following issues are important to be kept in mind –

The Army / SF is requisitioned for the aid to civil administration. Of course, if the area is declared 'disturbed area' the Army / SF may act under Armed Forces Special Power Act. The Act gives the power to any non-commissioned officer also to even kill any

person on suspicion. It does not mean that the power should be misused. The provision has been kept basically due to the extraordinary situations prevailing in the insurgency prone areas.

- The government has devised arrangement / structure for better coordination. In Assam the concept of Unified Headquarter was started in 1997. In the Unified HQ 3 groups were made as below: -
 - i. Strategy Group – Headed by Chief Secretary
 - ii. Operational Group – Headed by GOC 4 CORPS
 - iii. District Level Coordination Committee – Headed by Deputy Commissioner
- The main problem is ego problem many a times, specially in the sense that the officers do not want to attend the meetings in person due to comparison of ranks & hierarchy. Actually, if a structure is formed and approved by the government, there is no point in not obeying and following the same. On the other hand if an officer does not have ego problem, the meetings and interaction become more meaningful.
- Sometimes, it is also found that the meetings are not attended in person by the senior officers both from Civil and Military side and junior officers are deputed on their behalf to attend the meeting. In such crucial meetings, the junior officer can not take decision and informs that the matter will be discussed with his / her superior. Actually, it defeats the purpose of the meeting totally, as such meetings are not only crucial but also urgent and postponement of the decisions will prove counter productive many a times.
- Sharing of intelligence is again very-very important. The intelligence gathering is being done through various agencies, but still the information comes more easily to the civil administration. The civil police and civil administration are meeting the local populace formally as well as informally and they could feel the pulse better. The very purpose of these coordination meetings is to share the information and form the strategy for counter insurgency. However, in the field, it has been found that the sharing of information by various agencies is not being done very effectively. Here again the role of district administration as the facilitator may be crucial. A good and

mature district administrator will see to it in the meetings that it is done.

- Proper awareness about the rank and hierarchy of the setup in civil administration, Army, Para-Military Forces etc. should be given to all the staff / jawans etc. This is very much crucial, as many times the staff / jawans do not know the rank / hierarchy properly. There are many instances, when the Deputy Commissioners / SP / Executive Magistrates have not been allowed to proceed and stopped on the way for a long time. All such situations create bad taste and result in lowering of efficiency of counter insurgency strategy.
- The violation of Human Rights by the security forces is again an important issue and there is need to sensitize the staff / jawans for the same. The inputs on human rights should be included into the training curriculum accordingly for them.
- Development of the area is the responsibility of civil administration, but in the past, the Army has also contributed a little in the developmental process through Army Development Group. Construction of playgrounds, improvement of roads etc. has been taken-up in the remote tribal areas of North-East. Here also the civil administration could coordinate with the security forces, so that the same schemes are not repeated in the same area and more areas are covered.
- The good Civil-Military relations also facilitate for collection of information. In the far-flung areas and also in the border areas of North-East, telephone / wireless facilities are not available. The Army and security forces posted in those areas facilitate by providing information in urgent situations e.g. fire, flood, starvation, medical problems etc. on their own & exclusive network.
- Role of leadership is also very important in the insurgency areas. Both in the civil administration as well as in Army / SF. A good leader can achieve better results. As a good leader an officer has to be visionary, involving others as a team, provide good motivation and to be methodical in approach. In counter insurgency environment, there is always an unknown fear of being ambushed / attacked and motivation to achieve the desired results will play an important role. A good leader will

prepare his / her plans methodically by taking the support of everybody to achieve the optimum results.

- Stress management is also a very important area in the counter insurgency strategy. It has been found that on many occasions the security forces panic on slightest provocation / confusion and they resort to firing without even confirming the facts / assessing the situation instantaneously. In Nagaland, once firing was started in the town by the security forces, just after a tyre burst, presuming that the insurgents had attacked them. Such incidents make the environment more unmanageable hostile. There is need for stress management to be given due importance in the counter insurgency strategy.
- The jawans of Army / Security Forces are working in far flung remote areas leaving their families behind in their homes in main land. The family members may face different problems e.g. disputes, land matters, educational matters etc. It is a fact that the jawan sitting in the jungle for operations may be disturbed on account of these problems of families and will certainly be happy if the problems are solved. Here the role of district administration is very important and the civil administration may coordinate for solving the problems at the earliest. This will certainly boost the morale of the forces and they may be in a position to give the best results.
- The Army / Security Forces come to the disturbed area for curbing the insurgency, but they should not be seen as enemies of the local population. Actually, on the other hand the strategy should be to take along the population to wean them away from insurgency. The civil administration and security forces jointly may organize some sports events, exhibitions, mobile CSD canteens etc. for the benefit of the public. These promotional ventures will pay positive results in the long run.
- The sensitization towards the social and cultural ethos of the local population is also very important. The jawans of Army / Security Forces should be sensitized and made aware of the peculiar and rich culture & tradition of the population in which they are operating. Sometimes, it has been noticed that the jawans do not appreciate and ridicule the culture etc. of the local population. Similarly, the respect and dignity for the women is a cardinal value in the North-East. However,

sometimes there is a wrong perception amongst some of us that the ladies of North-East are free and loose in character. Actually, in the culture of tribal societies intermixing and making friendship is a common phenomena and it should not be misunderstood. Sometimes, some officers / jawans have been in trouble on this account.

- Many social organizations are working in the area. Some of them even may be either sympathizers or information agents of various underground outfits. However, sometimes they are also very useful for avoiding untoward incidents and also for planning better strategy. Both the district administration and the security forces should be alert and see through the design. However, as civil administration is meeting them off and on, the feedback about the mood / pulse of the public may also be ascertained from them.
- As per the law, any person arrested should be handed over to the nearest police station within the least possible time (maximum 24 hours). It is also found that many times this is violated and the detenu is not handed over in prescribed time. It results in filing of court cases / haebus corpus / writs etc. It should be avoided and proper coordination with the civil administration in such cases is necessary. Sometimes, if the situation becomes sensitive, it may lead to law and order problem for the civil administration. The social organizations mount lot of pressure, stage rally etc. for the release of the concerned individual. These things could be avoided if the person is handed over to the civil police at the earliest and sent to the joint interrogation cell.
- Many a times insurgents manage to get bail from the court and are released. Hence the whole process is defeated. The role of the judiciary is also important as well. It caste shadow over the efficacy of the system at times. However, the judiciary is dependent on the due legal process. Hence, it is important that the case is properly prepared with supporting documents / evidence by the police.
- It has also been found that sometime there is a nexus between the politicians and insurgents. The politicians use insurgents for the purpose of winning the elections, whereas the insurgents take the benefit in form of money etc. This is alarming and

should be watched seriously. Of course, the intelligence agencies send the reports to the Union Government regularly. The law of land should be followed strictly irrespective of rank and status.

Remedial Measures to Counter Insurgency

After the proper comprehension of the situation in Tripura it clearly emerges that the panacea to the violation of human rights in Tripura is the end of insurgency. The chances of ending insurgency are shown here in the following table (XXV) and diagram-XIV.

Table-XXV

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Can Insurgency be solved	Most likely	45	23	52	9	129	32.25
	Likely	37	34	31	78	180	45
	Least Likely	12	24	10	5	51	12.75
	Unlikely	7	19	7	8	41	10.25




Diagram-XIV

- It is felt by the majority (77.25%) that insurgency problem can be solved. The administrative endeavours are going on to improve the law and order in the changing situation. Police and Para military forces are predominantly playing a positive role. The violation of human rights by the state actors is less. Armed militant groups and ethnic groups commit the major violations. So the end of Insurgency through effective development may put an end to the Human rights violations in Tripura.
- The need for ending insurgency in Tripura is strongly felt. This is due to two reasons – firstly, for the economic development of the State, insurgency needs to be done away with. Secondly, the

inhuman atrocities and insecurity of the people caused by militant groups is a direct violation of human rights and a shame for human civilization. This is the need of the hour. The means to improve this situation is through dual path. One is through providing better means of life and the other one is timely catering to the needs of the people who are victims of Human rights violation.

- Unemployment and economic difficulties are the main reasons for more youth being attracted to the insurgent outfits. The frustration of the youth coupled with large amount of money offered by militant groups for doing unlawful activities is driving the youth (tribal & non-tribal) to join the extremist groups. Proper guidance to the capable youth in identifying the income-generating activities can solve the problem of insurgency to a great extent. A committed effort by the development agencies can make this happen. The developmental activities taking place should reach at the grass root level. Only when poor and needy receive the fruits of development, there will be more peace and less bloodshed in the State. When both the communities develop reasonably, mutual hatred and relative deprivation among them will gradually secede.
- Tripura has very high dropout rates at Madhyamik (class-x) and among the tribals the dropout rate is as high as 72%. In every 100 tribal children only 28 continue their education after Madhyamik. The remaining 72 children discontinued due to economic reasons and poor performance at school. The poor performance of tribal children at school is due to language problems, lack of teacher etc. A planned attempt to reduce dropout in the schools is the need of the hour. Education and creation of awareness among the people is thus another solution to combat the extremism and insurgency. An educated person with awareness of the world around is always more balanced and careful. Such awareness can bring a movement against insurgency and extremists among the civilians.
- In Tripura 74% of the people in interior areas are experiencing ethnic violence whether tribal or Bengalee (Non-tribal). The ethnic animosity and mutual suspicion are due to the perceived past injustice, lack of opportunities and enlargement of interest groups. Creation of more opportunities to people is very essential to answer the problem of economic difficulties. When the cake is big, every one can have a share but when the cake itself is small, everyone cannot have a share and more so equal share. So the development base needs to be made broader. The feelings of mutual hatred and suspicion between the two ethnic groups tend to fade away with development reaching the

doorsteps. Awareness and consciousness among the people will be helpful in sensitizing about the politics of the interest groups.

- Awareness of the legal provisions and safeguards among the people is needed urgently. The right to decent life and protection against any atrocities committed by insurgents can be enjoyed only when the civilians have legal awareness. The awareness among the civilians about the efforts of the insurgency and ethnic animosity is very essential. This kind of awareness through the media, active NGOs with publicity through plays, dance, drama and the like is very much needed. The role of Human Right Education is also very important.
- As earlier mentioned in Tripura, the human rights is mainly violated by the militants. As suggested by one of very senior officers of the Para-military forces, if insurgency is curbed gradually the cases of human rights violations will be automatically dropped. The three ways to curb militancy in Tripura as suggested by security officials are (a) Stop politicizing militancy (b) To know the problems of both communities (tribal and non-tribal) and try to solve their problems (c) To extend better education and civic facilities. These suggestions coming from experience if, implemented can be of valuable remedial measure.
- In this study, it is expressed by more than half (56.25%) that the quick response of the police is least likely. The lack of timely response many a time resulted in loss of life, more damage to property and inhuman difficulties. All these could have been avoided with the timely response of the police. The police response has to be more spontaneous and supportive. In this connection modernization of Police Force by giving better infrastructure & resources is very important.
- The displaced civilians (60.25%) due to ethnic riots and insurgent violence are eager and willing to go back to their original residence. But their primary demand is security (64.25%). Though so far in Tripura different security camps and establishments were maintained near disturbed areas, still civilians are not confident. Instead of increasing the number of deployment of forces, the available forces have to be given sufficient orientation and training in advanced techniques of jungle war fare. Mere increase in numbers will do no better. The presence of the security forces and the feeling of safe living need to be experienced by the civilians. This is possible only through planned and committed effort. The placement of the security forces should be based on the viability of providing security to people than political considerations.

- In addition to security and protection needs of the people, the administrative assistance is needed to maintain peace and order. The administrative response in general is satisfactory (63%) but sizable section (37%) amongst people feel that the administration is not very receptive. Administration needs to be sensitized to the actions of the police and security forces that are some times causing problems/inconvenience to the civilians. The rehabilitation activities can be more successful with the administrative personnel visiting regularly. About 65% of the respondents said that the visits of administrative personnel are occasional. The majority (58%) of the respondents opined that they are not satisfied with administrative response in the event of a crisis or conflict. Effective crisis-management systems and practices need to be developed in the administration. Co-ordination of different wings of the administration during the times of trouble is very crucial. Preparedness and planned action should be the policy of the administration for crisis management and peace restoration.
- In Tripura kidnapping incidents are more (30% of respondents experienced). The release of kidnapped persons is secured mainly by paying money (52.75%). The ransom amount ranges from Rs. 1000 to Rs 2 lakhs generally. Though police assistance (35.5%) is received in securing the release, the attempts are not always secure. Interior areas with jungles and hills are a safe hideout for the kidnappers. The police need to be given special jungle warfare techniques. The police should know the topography of the area where they are conducting operations. These might have a positive impact in securing the release of kidnapped people. The security and information networks should be strong to effectively counter check these kind of insurgent activities.
- On few occasions Human rights violation is caused by security forces e.g. torture and degrading treatment in custody and delay in production before the magistrate. So making each member of the police and Para-military forces aware about legal enactment regarding Human rights and the need to perform their duties within these parameters set by law is very essential. In the event of the violations by police or paramilitary forces, different forums like courts and media need to play a key role to bring to the notice of appropriate authority for remedial measures.
- Tripura has no commission or cell that deals with the issue of human rights. The state legal services cell takes the initiative in some cases. The formation of the State Human Rights cell or State human rights commission is the need of the hour.

- An effective rehabilitation package for the surrendered extremists will attract them to join the mainstream. An effective development policy with long-term measures can to a great extent mitigate insurgency, ethnic violence and the resulting human rights violations.
- Many a times the insurgent groups do Human Rights violations and run away to border (Bangladesh). It is suggested that proper vigil at border is required so that this may be checked. It will solve the problem to a great extent.
- The officers of the police and paramilitary personnel should be made sensitive about human rights. The state needs to take stringent action against the violators of human rights to maintain peace and development in the state.

In a nutshell, Development (trickle-down), administrative planning, education, awareness and conscious security measures and policing can put an end to insurgency. In Tripura end of insurgency implies end of Human rights violations.


In addition to the above there are other related issues, which also affect the human rights directly or indirectly. Working and operating in conflict area is not an easy task. The administration in the North-East is not the same as in the main land. One has to adopt a different approach altogether for these areas.

- The people of this area have been in geographical isolation for a long time. The culture and traditions are also different and unique. Hence they feel themselves different from the main land countrymen and adopt "You Indians" approach. Of course, this tendency is decreasing with better contact and development. Now with the use of information technology, a Tripuri boy sitting in Agartala may chat with a boy sitting in Kerala on a computer. It is a good sign and will facilitate the process of national integration. It will indirectly curb insurgency
- The Center and States have to work together for the development of the area. All the government agencies – civil administration, Army, Paramilitary etc. have to work together in close coordination, shedding their egos and other personal attitudinal problems.
- The infrastructure has to be improved, as it is the backbone for the economy. Tourism can be developed and improved in the region. The inner line permit process etc. needs to be moderated / revised.

- Due to geographical isolation, it is very important that border trade with Bangladesh should be made flexible and feasible. Due to high transportation cost and other factors the products of North-East may not be cost effective for the main land. Hence, it will be more appropriate to develop the border trade and suitable policies should be framed accordingly. This will certainly facilitate the development of the area with greater pace.
- More cultural and social interaction with the rest of India is required through sports, educational tours etc.
- The Center should also continue dialogues with the insurgent groups who are keen, within the constitutional framework.
- The hallmark is good governance. The governance has to be improved by all players so that the common citizen feels satisfied and is not further alienated. It will come with the process of accountability into the system. The government servants in all services have to be more accountable for their actions / in-actions.
- Corruption and leakage of funds is also a serious concern in the North-East. Actually, corruption is not a phenomenon only in North-East. It is very much penetrated in our society and even in the advanced states. However, in the North-East as there is no industrial development, the kitty for corruption is the government money. It is an easy money for politicians, bureaucrats and the contractors. Due to rampant corruption, the development comes to stand still on one hand and the underground start extorting and interfering on the other hand. Certainly corruption should be checked and strict actions are required by all concerned agencies.
- Finally, strong will & vision is necessary for all round development of the area. This will certainly improve the situation. Strong penal actions for violating human rights will also be a signal to improve the violation index of Human Rights. Here the proactive role of state Human Rights Commission is also very important.

Present Status of Districts & Sub-Divisions

INDIA
BANGLADESH



BANGLADESH

Annexures-I

TABLE-I

SOCIO -ECONOMIC PROFILE

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Sex	Male	84	75	86	57	302	75.5
	Female	16	25	14	43	98	24.5
Caste	General	32	30	65	21	148	37
	SC	22	13	6	15	56	14
	ST	28	48	20	49	145	36.25
	Others	17	9	9	15	50	12.5
Religion	Hindu	80	73	87	59	299	74.75
	Christian	11	15	10	25	61	15.25
	Muslim	7	2	0	12	21	5.25
	Buddhist	2	0	3	4	9	2.25
	Others	0	10	0	0	10	2.5
Education	Illiterate	12	36	5	57	110	27.5
	Primary	32	31	43	11	117	29.25
	Secondary	31	16	22	28	97	24.25
	Higher Sec	16	12	9	0	37	9.25
	Graduate	9	5	21	4	39	9.75
Income (Monthly)	Below 1500	35	58	61	56	210	52.5
	1500-2500	32	20	25	37	114	28.5
	2500-5000	27	12	13	3	55	13.75
	5000-7500	6	12	17	0	35	8.75
Occupation	Labourer /cultivator	42	49	47	70	208	52
	Business	27	20	22	29	98	24.5
	Employed (III)	6	24	26	0	56	14
	Class IV	15	7	5	1	28	7

TABLE-II

NATURE OF PROBLEM FACED

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Victim Of Extremism	Yes	71	73	96	97	337	48.14
	No	29	27	4	3	63	15.75
Problem Encountered	Kidnapping	31	31	11	50	123	30.75
	Killing	12	15	40	2	69	17.25
	Extortion	28	17	39	32	116	29
	Threat	29	36	10	17	92	23
Reason	Diff. Pol. Party	25	19	0	6	50	12.5
	Wealthy	24	18	0	7	49	12.25
	Ethnic Group	51	27	100	42	220	55
	Suspicion	0	36	0	45	81	20.25
Tax Payment	Always	39	37	5	14	95	23.75
	Occasionally	32	25	6	25	88	22
	Never	29	33	89	61	212	53
Reason	Support	34	0	0	1	35	8.75
	Fear	66	100	100	99	365	91.25

TABLE-III

AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Basic Needs	Available	36	10	20	23	89	22.25
	Mostly available	20	45	48	37	150	37.5
	Not available	44	45	32	40	161	40.25
Reasons for Non availability	Extremism	36	61	51	55	203	50.75
	Slow Development	20	25	25	30	100	25
	Admn. Negligence	44	24	24	15	107	26.75
Reasons to Join Insurgent groups	Unemployment	34	23	60	58	175	43.75
	Economic Reasons	54	49	36	22	161	40.25
	Ignorance / illiteracy	12	4	0	0	16	4
	Police harassment	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Tribal Development	0	14	4	20	38	9.5

TABLE-IV ETHNIC SITUATION

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Harmony in Res. Area	Yes	57	64	5	39	165	41.25
	No	43	36	95	61	235	58.75
Experience of Eth. Violence	Yes	52	47	100	94	293	73.25
	No	48	53	0	6	107	26.75
Reasons for ethnic Violence	Past injustice	33	41	0	60	134	33.5
	Lack of opportunities	7	21	90	8	126	31.5
	Encourage Of groups	60	18	10	19	107	26.75
	Ethnic Animosity	0	20	0	13	33	8.25
Immediate Reason for ethnic Violence	Arrest	12	13	13	7	45	11.25
	Killing	45	45	36	29	155	38.75
	Kidnapping	43	21	52	71	187	46.75
	Extortion	0	3	12	0	15	3.75
	Political Instigation	0	9	0	0	9	2.25
Reasons for Violence by Extremists	Political Rivalry	42	13	0	10	65	16.25
	Suspicion as Police informer	21	21	10	49	101	25.25
	Disobedience to their Orders	36	49	20	24	129	32.25
	Different ethnic group	1	17	70	17	105	26.25
Revenge / retribution reason for violence	Yes	35	64	41	71	211	52.75
	No	65	36	59	29	189	47.25
Source of help to get release of kidnapped	Police	5	29	32	10	142	35.5
	Party	15	2	0	0	17	4.25
	Villagers	0	25	61	10	96	24
	Paying money	80	44	7	80	211	52.75

TABLE-V

ROLE OF POLICE

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Police quick response	Likely	33	27	5	33	98	24.5
	Least likely	58	40	65	65	228	56.25
	Most likely	9	33	30	2	74	18.5
Arrest of real culprits	Likely	68	31	37	32	168	42
	Most likely	29	26	48	35	138	34.5
	Least likely	3	43	15	33	94	23.5
Arrest with warrant	Always	95	12	19	7	133	33.25
	Occasionally	3	54	81	68	206	51.5
	Never	2	34	0	25	61	15.25
Any arrest in residing area under NASA	Yes	59	37	38	76	210	52.5
	No	41	63	52	24	180	45
Nature of arrested persons	Extremists	75	34	78	71	258	64.5
	Innocents	25	63	22	29	139	34.75
Are innocents arrests Deliberate	Yes	86	20	41	76	223	55.75
	No	14	80	59	54	207	51.75
Police violation of Human rights	Yes	17	10	0	46	74	18.5
	No	77	81	100	68	326	81.5
Police Security in case of trouble	Yes	28	19	0	40	87	21.75
	No	72	81	100	60	313	78.25
Police Excesses	Yes	28	33	0	36	97	24.25
	No	72	67	100	64	303	75.75

TABLE-VI

ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Change of Residence due to insurgency	Yes	62	19	68	76	225	56.25
	No	38	81	32	24	175	43.75
Assistance from state	Yes	55	25	57	59	196	49
	No	45	75	43	41	204	51
Earlier Facilities Available	Almost	58	10	36	11	115	28.75
	Only Some	40	48	26	69	183	45.75
	Don't have	2	42	38	20	102	25.5
Willingness to go back to original resi.	Yes	50	32	80	79	241	60.25
	No	50	68	20	21	159	39.75
Conditions to return back	Security	61	80	51	65	257	64.25
	Accommodation	39	8	18	9	74	18.5
	Peaceful Co-existence	0	12	41	16	69	17.25

TABLE-VII

TIMES OF TROUBLE

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Source of support during times of trouble	Administration	52	7	34	8	101	25.25
	Police	43	62	35	78	218	54.5
	Armed forces	5	21	21	4	51	12.75
	Community	0	10	10	10	30	7.5
Nature of Administration. Response	Immediately	20	8	39	0	67	16.75
	Slow	75	45	49	79	248	62
	Delayed	5	47	12	21	85	21.25
Details of Admn. rehabilitation	Providing Security	77	42	29	74	222	55.5
	Accommodation	23	33	31	6	93	23.25
	Basic Necessities	0	25	40	20	85	21.25
Satisfaction with Admn. response	Yes	35	19	56	58	168	42
	No	65	81	44	42	232	58
Visit of Admn. personnel	Regular	25	8	52	0	85	21.25
	Occasionally	75	62	36	85	258	64.5
	Never	0	30	12	15	57	14.25
Nature of Admn. Response in case of police / armed forces	Receptive to complaints	40	18	62	13	133	33.25
	Not receptive	35	45	0	68	148	37
	Punishes Offenders	15	15	37	7	74	18.5
	Do not punish	10	22	1	12	45	11.25

TABLE-VIII

PARAMILITARY FORCES

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
Role of army/paramilitary forces	Positive	68	49	76	58	251	62.75
	Negative	32	51	24	42	149	32.75
Response during times of trouble	Polite	45	35	0	2	82	20.5
	Harsh	27	32	91	75	225	56.25
	Indifferent	28	33	9	23	93	23.25
Nature of assistance during times of trouble	Providing Security	66	31	43	58	198	49.5
	Accommodation	19	5	8	3	35	8.75
	Transport	4	17	4	5	30	7.5
	Facilitator	8	8	34	13	63	15.75
	Do not help	3	39	11	21	74	18.5
Atrocities committed by armed forces	Yes	15	19	9	63	106	26.5
	No	85	81	91	37	294	58.8
Nature of Excesses	Movement curtailed	5	10	9	2	26	6.5
	Beating	10	4	0	36	50	12.5
	Arrest without warrant	0	5	0	21	26	6.5
	Money extortion	0	0	0	4	106	26.5
Awareness of NASA	Yes	29	38	50	72	189	47.25
	No	71	62	50	28	211	52.75
Any arrests under NASA	Yes	56	38	38	77	209	52.25
	No	44	62	62	23	191	47.75
Is NASA arrest justified	Yes	57	71	60	63	251	62.75
	No	43	29	40	37	149	37.25

TABLE-IX

MISCELLANEOUS

		North	Dhalai	West	South	Total	%age
NGO presence	Yes	18	35	70	8	131	32.75
	No	82	65	30	92	269	67.25
Age of NGO	Below 1 year	0	13	43	0	56	14
	Past 1-2 years	7	15	14	0	36	9
	More than 2 years	11	7	13	0	31	7.75
Sphere of NGO activities	Economic Support	0	15	56	0	71	17.75
	Education	18	17	14	0	49	12.25
	Police atrocities	0	1	0	0	1	0.25
	Insurgent atrocities	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Army excesses	0	0	0	0	0	0
	All of these	0	1	0	0	1	0.25
	Others	0	2	0	0	2	0.5
Interaction between NGO Admn. and Police	Never	18	15	0	8	41	10.25
	Occasionally	0	20	61	0	81	5.25
	Regularly	0	2	9	0	11	2.75
Emphasis of NGO's work	Development Needs	18	25	70	8	164	41
	Police Grievances	0	5	0	0	5	1.25
	Human Rights Violation	0	5	0	0	5	1.25
NGO's Role Positive	Yes	18	17	60	8	103	25.75
	No	0	18	10	0	28	7
Can Insurgency be solved	Most likely	45	23	52	9	129	32.25
	Likely	37	34	31	78	180	22.5
	Least Likely	12	24	10	5	51	12.75
	Unlikely	7	19	7	8	41	10.25

Annexure-II

Insurgency Situation in Tripura (April 1993- December 2001)

Year	Total No. kidnapped	Release after Ransom	Killed among kidnapped	Still untraced	Police & security personnel killed	Total killed by insurgents	House burning incidents
1993	96	82	9	5	12	85	38
1994	216	188	22	6	14	99	162
1995	367	227	21	19	26	112	205
1996	294	262	16	16	28	116	302
1997	158	128	16	14	49	206	3122
1998	401	328	12	61	23	211	3392
1999	480	325	24	131	46	227	1140
2000	474	400	7	67	12	207	N.A
Total	2486	1940	127	319	210	1263	8361

Source: 1. Records of Home Department.

2. Records of Tripura Legislative Assembly.

Quoted in *satrasklanta Tripura* by Jayanto Debnath 2001, *Dainik Sambad Publications, Agartala*

Total number of people affected in violence in Tripura

(April 1993- 31st Dec.2000)

Year	KILLED			KIDNAPPED		
	Non-Tribal	Tribal	Total	Non-Tribal	Tribal	Total
1993	42	43	85	58	48	96
1994	37	62	99	140	76	216
1995	78	44	122	292	75	367
1996	95	21	116	271	23	294
1997	139	62	206	129	29	156
1998	132	71	211	346	55	401
1999	143	66	227	435	45	480
2000	150	57	207	402	72	474
Total	816	1027	1273	2073	413	2486

Source: 1. Records of Home Department.

2. Records of Tripura Legislative Assembly.

Quoted in Satrasklanta Tripura by Jayanto Debnath 2001, Dainik Sambad Publications, Agartala

Details of Extremist Violence

Year	Total extremist attack	Common people killed	Total arrested		Arrested over ground	Total police personnel	Extremist killed	Encoun- ter with extremist
			Hard core extremists	Arrested for questioning				
1997	219	206	30	339	275	49	15	20
1998	342	211	58	122	279	23	22	16
1999	367	227	111	361	498	46	19	42
2000	397	264	128	559	694	15	40	89
25 Nov.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1325	908	323	1381	1746	133	96	167

Source: 1) Records of Home Department.

2) Records of Tripura Legislative Assembly

Quoted in Satrasklanta Tripura by Jayanto Debnath 2001, Dainik Sambad Publications, Agartala

Annexure-III

Few Incidents

1. Ex-Health Minister Shri Bimal Sinha and his brother Shri Bidyut Sinha died of bullet injury when Shri Bimal Sinha went to speak to the insurgents to rescue his brother, at Abanga Ghat under Salema Police Station, Kamalpur Sub-Division in Dhalai District on 31-03-98.
2. In an extremist attack altogether 3 persons were killed including 6-year-old child Sukhesh Sarkar at Ghagrachara under Manu Police station area on April 11, 2000. The extremist kidnapped two others.
3. A five years old school boy of Holy cross Kathalchara was kidnapped by the militants. He was kidnapped on the way of his school (Mohit Jha) on July 7, 2000.
4. In a pre-planned attack militants killed 3 villagers in Haripur of Gandacherra on May 16,2000, while they were sleeping. The victims were identified as Ratan Sarkar (25), Shyama Charan Sarkar (20) and Maya Rani Sarkar (40).
5. Shri Lal Mohan Debnath (40) was kidnapped on March 4, 2002, from a village of Gandachara Subdivision. After seven days of kidnapping Mr. Debnath was shot dead.
6. One pregnant woman Lati Reang (24) was raped by the militants at gun point in Karnamani Para of Gandachara. The extremist expelled fetus from the womb of the woman.
7. On October 17,99, 5 fishermen were kidnapped from Dumbur Lake. Till date they were traceless.
8. One Mamina Begam (25) was gang raped on April 12,2000 in Ganganagar village under Ambassa Police Station by NLFT rebels.
9. There were ethnic riots in 1998 on 13th November and 14th November at Panchavati in Mohanpur block. 18 people

were killed and 7 non-tribals were kidnapped. Later 5 were released after paying 1.5 lakh money. But still two are untraced till date. Many families had to shift their home.

10. In Jirania of West Tripura in 2000 Non-tribal militants initiated attacks on tribals at Harijoyroajapara. This led to mutual attacks by tribals and non tribals.
11. In 1999 in bishramganj area of Bishalgarh Sub-division at Itbatta, non-tribals were attacked by tribal militants. Six persons were killed and one married lady, Protima Deb was raped and hanged to death by extremists.
12. In bishramganj area only Raten dutta was taken captive but so far did not return, Inspite of paying one lakh rupees ransom.
13. There were many incidents of bomb hurling at the commando jeeps by both tribal and non-tribal insurgents. This caused many a times severe human loss, as almost all the passengers die and some may suffer fatal injuries.
14. The security personnel are regular targets of insurgents. In 2002, two major incidents happened in the state where almost 30 security personnel were killed in insurgent ambush.
15. It was reported that around 11 women were raped by the insurgents in Raiyabari area. The families moved to the town areas leaving their villages.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Part I

1. Name:

2. Age:

3. Sex:

- a) Male
- b) Female

4. Caste:

- a) General
- b) S.C
- c) S.T
- d) OBC
- e) Others

5. Religion:

- a) Hindu
- b) Christian
- c) Muslim
- d) Buddhist
- e) Others

6. Education Status:

- a) Primary
- b) Secondary
- c) Higher Secondary
- d) Graduation
- e) Illiterate

7. Income Details:

- a) Below Rs 1500/-
- b) Rs1500-2500/-
- c) Rs2500-5000/-
- d) Rs5000-7500/-

8. Occupation:

- a) Unemployed
- b) Labourer
- c) Class IV
- d) Business
- e) Middle Class Employee

9. What is the present source of income and how much?

Part – II: Causes of Human rights violation

1. Have you ever been a victim of extremist organizations?

Yes

No

2. Please specify the problems you had faced?

- a) Kidnapping
- b) Killing
- c) Extortion
- d) Threat

3. Why it has happened to you?

- a) You Belong to different Political party
- b) You are a wealthy person
- c) You belong to different ethnic group
- d) Suspicion as the police informer

4. Do you pay or have paid any taxes to extremists?

- a) Always
- b) Occasionally
- c) Never

5. Why did you pay taxes to extremists?

- a) I support them
- b) Fear of extremists

6. Did any time extremists supported/ helped you?

- a) Always
- b) Sometimes
- c) Never

7. If so, why?

8. How?

9. Do you have any idea why young men join insurgency groups?

- a) Unemployment
- b) Economic Reasons
- c) Ignorance/lack of education
- d) Police harassment
- e) Tribal development

10. Have your basic needs of life – drinking water, health, education etc are available to you?
- a) Available
 - b) Mostly Available
 - c) Not Available
11. Do you have any idea why these basic amenities could not be provided to you?
12. Did you change your residence due to insurgency?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
13. Do you have all the earlier facilities now also?
- a) Almost
 - b) Only some
 - c) Don't have
14. Do you think there is harmony in your residential area among different groups?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
15. If the answer is no, what are the reasons for mutual mistrust?
- a) Belong to different ethnic groups
 - b) Belong to different political groups
 - c) Relative deprivation
16. Did you ever experience ethnic violence or discrimination?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
17. What are the reasons for ethnic violence?
- a) Past injustice
 - b) Scarcity of opportunities
 - c) Encouragement by interest groups
 - d) Development of one group only
18. What is the immediate reason for ethnic violence?
- a) Killing
 - b) Kidnapping
 - c) Arrest
 - d) Political instigation
19. Why the people are killed/kidnapped by the anti-social elements?
- a) Political Rivalry
 - b) Suspicion as police informer
 - c) Failure to follow their orders
 - d) Belong to different ethnic group

20. Who helped to get the release of kidnapped persons?
- a) Police
 - b) Political parties
 - c) Villages.
 - d) By Paying money
21. Is retribution and revenge the reason for violence (Kidnapping/Killing)?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
22. During the times of violence the police act fairly- Your Opinion?
- a) Likely
 - b) Least Likely
 - c) Most likely
23. Do the police arrest the real culprits?
- a) Likely
 - b) Most likely
 - c) Least likely
24. Do the police make arrests in your village with proper notice/warrant?
- a) Always
 - b) Occasionally
 - c) Never
25. When you were a victim of violence who helped you?
- a) Administration
 - b) Police
 - c) Political Party
 - d) NGO
 - e) Self-help
26. Did the police arrest any extremists in your area?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
27. Are they really extremists or innocents?
- a) Extremists
 - b) Innocents
28. Did the police do it deliberately?
29. Did you get any help from the State during the times of need?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
30. Please list out the benefits you have received -

31. Would you like to go back to your original place of living?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
32. If so, any conditions?
- a) Want Security
 - b) Want accommodation
 - c) Peaceful co-existence
33. Can insurgency be solved?
- a) Most likely
 - b) Likely
 - c) Least likely
 - d) Unlikely
34. Whom do you approach in case of need or trouble?
- a) Administrators
 - b) Police
 - c) Armed forces
 - d) Village elders
35. When does the people's from administration come to you during the times of trouble?
- a) Immediately
 - b) Little later
 - c) After long wait
36. What are the rehabilitation and restoration measures taken by administration?
- a) Providing police security
 - b) Arranging accommodation
 - c) Providing basic necessities
37. Are you satisfied with the response of administration
- a) Yes
 - b) No
38. How frequently does the administrative personnel visit your area?
- a) Regularly
 - b) Occasionally
 - c) Never
39. What is the response of administration in case of atrocities by police / army?
- a) Receptive to complaints
 - b) Not receptive
 - c) Punishes offenders
 - d) Do not punish

40. Do you think police ever violated your rights (like – rights to life, education, movement, movement, freedom, speech, employment and the like)?
- Yes
 - No
41. What violation did police commit on you?
- Not allowed free movement
 - Arrest without warrant
 - Detention without producing in court
 - Continuous harassment
42. Do you have assured police security in your locality?
- Yes
 - No
43. Whether police behave excessively?
- Yes
 - No
44. What is the role the army and paramilitary are playing?
- Providing security
 - Providing accommodation
 - Providing transport
 - Act as a facilitator
 - Do not help
45. Are you a victim of atrocities committed by security forces?
46. What are the excesses / atrocities?
- No movement
 - Seating
 - Arrest without warrant
 - Money extortions
47. Are you aware of Armed Forces Special Powers Act?
- Yes
 - No
48. Are you aware of NSA ?
49. Was any body arrested under NSA
50. Is it justified
51. Is there any NGO working in your area?
- Yes
 - No

52. Since how long is that NGO working in your area?
- a) Recently
 - b) Past 1-2 years
 - c) More than 2 years
53. What kind of activities the NGO is engaged in ?
- a) Economic support
 - b) Education
 - c) Taking up police atrocities
 - d) Take up atrocities by insurgents
 - e) Taking up army excesses
 - f) All of these
 - g) None of these
54. Does this NGO has rapport with the civil administration and police?
- a) Never
 - b) Occasionally
 - c) Regularly
55. Does the NGO take up public grievances?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
56. What kinds of issues are taken up by the NGO?
- a) Developmental Needs
 - b) Police grievances
 - c) Human rights violations
57. Do you think presence of NGO made a positive difference in your area?
- a) Yes
 - b) No

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